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Abstract Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi have recently argued against a
simulationist interpretation of neural resonance. Recognizing intentions and emo-
tions in the facial expressions and gestures of others may be subserved by e.g. mirror
neuron activity, but this does not mean that we first experience an intention or
emotion and then project it onto the other. Mirror neurons subserve social cognition,
according to Gallagher and Zahavi, by being integral parts of processes of enactive
social perception. I argue that the notion of enactive social perception does not yet
explain why social perception is subserved by mirroring. I also argue that this
problem cannot be avoided by means of an appeal to multiple realization. Instead, I
propose a holistic model of neural resonance-based social cognition that does give
an explanatory role to mirroring by allowing for a partial experiential overlap
between experiencing and recognizing emotions and intentions. This account avoids
the simulationist step-wise conception of social cognition and recognizes the
qualitative difference between first- and third-person emotion and intention
attribution. It does capture too much of the simulationist intuitions, however, to
warrant the label ‘social perception’.
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Introduction
In the past 16 years, neuroscience has provided a massive amount of data suggesting
that mirror neurons, shared representations or in general resonance mechanisms
underlie our ability to read basic intentions and emotions into the behaviour of other
people. According to what is arguably the most influential interpretation, these data
support a version of the simulation theory of social cognition (cf., e.g. Gallese and
Goldman 1998; Goldman and Sripada 2005; Goldman 2006; Gallese 2001, 2003,
2005, 2007; Jeannerod and Pacherie 2004). The evidence on neural resonance is
taken, by the many scientists and philosophers who accept this interpretation, to
show that low-level social cognition is subserved by implicit simulation of gestures,
actions and facial expressions.
The implicit simulation interpretation of neural resonance has been attacked by
those inclined towards more cognitivist approaches to mindreading (Jacob 2002,
2008; Jacob and Jeannerod 2005; Saxe 2005, 2009; Csibra 2005). Recently,
however, it has been attacked from a camp that theorists of neural resonance so far
considered to be an ally: phenomenology (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008a, b; Gallagher
2007a, b, 2008a, b; Zahavi 2005, 2008). Rather than simulation, phenomenologists
suggest that resonance phenomena should be interpreted as contributing to enactive
social perception.
According to Gallagher and Zahavi, to interpret, e.g. the activity of mirror
neurons as contributing to a simulation process for the purpose of ‘mind-reading’,
we need to conceive of such a process as a step-wise procedure: First, our mirror
neuron activity represents the motor intention of the observed other; secondly, we
project the represented intention onto the other. The problem with this procedure is
that on the one hand, it does not adequately capture our phenomenology. We see
intentions in the gestures of others and we directly perceive emotions in their facial
expressions. We do not experience ourselves going through step-wise procedures on
such occasions. On the other hand, according to Gallagher and Zahavi, at the neural
level, the term ‘simulation’ does not really apply to the activity of mirror neurons.
I believe that this line of argumentation is strictly speaking correct. I also believe,
however, that there is a threat of throwing away the baby with the bathwater. There
is something unexpected and exciting about the notion of shared representations: the
overlap, at the neural level and arguably at the phenomenological level, between
intending and observing an intentional action or between experiencing an emotion
and recognizing a similar emotion in another person’s comportment. This overlap
threatens to be ignored when neural resonance is merely said to contribute to social
perception. It is acknowledged by simulationists, however mistaken they may be in
other respects. The question I shall try to answer in this paper is how the baby, i.e.
this overlap, can be preserved when we get rid of the bathwater, i.e. a conception of
social perception in terms of a step-wise procedure. If we cannot account for this
overlap in terms of the identity between certain stages of different processes, e.g.
experiencing one’s own emotions and observing the emotions of others, as I take
Gallagher and Zahavi to show convincingly, then how else can we account for its
role in social cognition?
My aim is to answer this question, in the third section of this paper, in terms of a
holistic model of neural resonance-based low-level social cognition. This model is
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intended to be compatible with Gallagher and Zahavi’s position. But it is also intended
as an answer to a question that I will claim not to be answered satisfactorily by the social
perception interpretation of shared representations, in the second section. Some
elements in this model are not straightforwardly congenial to the tenets of Gallagher
and Zahavi’s position. I will agree that the label ‘simulation’ is wrong and misleading,
but since I will claim that there is a crucial feature of neural resonance that simulationists
do and phenomenologists do not capture well—the overlap mentioned above—I also
think that ‘social perception’ is not entirely correct. Maybe we should stop forcing
personal-level terminology on sub-personal processes altogether. These terms do not
illuminate the data. In fact, we might even, as I will suggest at the end of this paper, go
one step further and acknowledge that insight into the sub-personal processes that
underlie social cognition illuminates our phenomenology in this area: It is neither
simulation nor perception, but something in between.
But let me start by outlining the idea of neural resonance, the simulationist
interpretation thereof, Gallagher and Zahavi’s criticism of this interpretation and
what I claim this criticism overlooks.
Implicit simulation versus enactive social perception
Neural resonance as implicit simulation
The principal target of the phenomenologist’s criticism is the simulationist
interpretation of mirror neurons. Mirror neurons fire both during the execution of
specific goal-directed actions and during the observation of the same specific actions
performed by others. Not long after they appeared on the scientific stage (di
Pellegrino et al. 1992; Rizzolatti et al. 1996), it was proposed, in a seminal paper by
Gallese and Goldman (1998), that mirror mechanisms are either a precursor or a
primitive version of simulation routines for mindreading.
Such routines were introduced in the late 1980s in the theories of mind debate as
alternatives to the so-called theory–theory approach to social cognition (Gordon
1986; Heal 1986; Goldman 1989). Up until 1986, it was uncontroversial that
understanding others, interpreting their behaviour in terms of intentions and
emotions, involves the tacit use of theoretical knowledge. But according to the
simulation theory, we use our own minds as models for understanding the minds of
others—we understand others by imaginatively putting ourselves in their shoes.
Up until the 1998 paper by Gallese and Goldman, the simulation theory
concerned so-called high-level mind reading (Goldman’s 2006 terminology) only,
i.e. the ascription of propositional attitudes. The simulationist reading of mirror
neurons, by contrast, introduced a low-level version of the simulation theory. That is,
the understanding of primitive motor intentions or goal directedness in the behaviour
of others was now also approached via simulation. Low-level simulation routines by
mirror mechanisms are entirely exogenously produced. That is, unlike much of our
high-level mindreading, the trigger for a mirror neuron-based simulation routine is
the observed behaviour of the other, not an internal decision of the simulator/mind
reader. This is why mirroring is also referred to as neural resonance. Gallagher and
Zahavi speak of ‘implicit simulation’.
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In the past 10 years, the basic idea of Gallese and Goldman has been expanded
and, at least in the case of Gallese, partly altered. Four changes need to be
mentioned:
1. In Gallese and Goldman (1998), simulation by mirror neurons was considered to
serve the purpose of retrodictive ascription of low-level mental states. The
intention preceding an observed action, for instance, was thought to be grasped
by neurally mimicking that action. Nowadays, mirror neurons are primarily
considered to underlie predictive understanding of actions of others. That is,
they do not just pick up the motor intentions behind bodily movements (pace
Jacob and Jeannerod 2005), but rather mimic individual movements as
belonging to ‘logically’ related sequences carrying out an intention that is
pitched higher than mere motor intentions (Iacoboni et al. 2005; Fogassi et al.
2005).1 For instance, grasping a cup can be mirrored through the influence of
context cues as ‘grasping a cup in order to take a sip of tea’, thus predicting
further specific behaviour (bringing the cup to mouth, sipping).
2. Whereas the original connection between mirror mechanisms and simulation
concerned the pickup of intentions only—be they simple motor intentions or
more complex ones—mirroring mechanisms are now thought to underlie the
pickup of other low-level mental states too. Goldman now includes emotions in
low-level simulation (Goldman and Sripada 2005; Goldman 2006), and Gallese
(2001) proposes that mirroring underlies a general empathic understanding of
others that encompasses, e.g. sensations, pains and emotions alongside basic
intentions.
3. Originally, the mirror neuron version of simulationism was an entirely sub-
personal affair. Gallese (2001), however, is explicit that his expanded version of
mirror mechanism-based simulationism, the empathic understanding of others
based on the fact that observation and execution of all sorts of meaningful action
is mapped onto the same neural substrate, also allows for a phenomenologically
accessible sharing of, e.g. emotions with others. We can think not only of simple
emotional contagion (Hatfield et al. 1994) here but also of more complex forms
of empathy. This expansion is important for what is to follow.
4. The last change relative to the 1998 proposal I will mention, which is also
important for what is to follow, is the fact that many theorists now hold that
since the same neural substrate underlies the execution and observation of
intentional actions, activation of that substrate in itself is neither a first-personal
nor a third-personal intention representation. It is a neutral intention represen-
tation (de Vignemont 2004; Hurley 2005; Gallese 2005) or a representation of a
‘naked intention’ (Jeannerod and Pacherie 2004).
1 Jacob (2008, pp. 212–213) considers this a substantial alteration of the original proposal. But note that
Gallese (2001, pp. 39–42) already considers the predictive functions of mirror neurons an integral part of
his simulationist proposal.
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Against simulation, for enactive perception
In order to see what is objectionable in the simulationist reading of mirror neuron
activity, we should look at the role that is assigned to mirror neurons by this
interpretation in the overall process of grasping the meaning of, e.g. another person’s
gestures or emotional expression. Here is the standard view to which Gallagher and
Zahavi object:
[W]hen mental matching occurs by means of a regular causal pathway, I will
consider it an instance of mirroring—and an instance of mental simulation. But
it isn’t yet (…) an instance of simulation-based mindreading.
What more is required for there to be mindreading? (…) [M]indreading
involves mental attribution to a target. (Goldman 2006, p. 133)
Mirroring or neural resonance taken as simulation, however implicit, is not
considered to be sufficient for social cognition. On the standard simulationist
interpretation, it needs to be supplemented by an act of attribution of the mirrored
state to the observed person. Goldman conceives of this in terms of ‘projection’, by
which he means ‘the act of assigning a state of one’s own to someone else’
(Goldman 2006, p. 40). Thus, when I see happiness in your face, what happens in
fact, according to Goldman, is the following: I experience a (possibly weaker) copy
of your happiness due to resonance or mirroring. I do not, however, ascribe this
happiness to myself but proceed to project it onto you.
This is an objectionably Cartesian (Carruthers 1996) picture of social cognition.
As Zahavi puts it, ‘the simulation-plus-projection procedure imprisons me within my
own mind (…) and prevents me from ever achieving a true understanding of others.’
(Zahavi 2008, p. 519). This is not how we experience things. We see happiness in a
smiling face; we do not infer it from the happiness we feel ourselves. We do not look
inside ourselves in order to discern emotions and intentions of others. We look at
them and see their emotions and intentions. Zahavi: ‘When I experience the facial
expressions or meaningful actions of an other, I am experiencing foreign
subjectivity, and not merely imagining it, simulating it or theorizing about it.’
(Zahavi 2008, p. 520). In Gallagher’s words, we experience intentions and emotions
‘fully clothed in agent specification’ (Gallagher 2007a, p. 358). Phenomenologically
speaking, there is no step-wise mirroring-followed-by-projection procedure.
Goldman’s response to this charge is that mirror neurons only contribute to a sub-
personal, implicit form of simulation. If the step-wise procedure mirror neurons are
involved in does not trickle through to the experiential level, this is at least no objection
to implicit, sub-personal simulationism. The question is, of course, how my mirroring
brain knows that the ‘happiness’ I register as a result of looking at your smile is in fact
not my own happiness but yours, or how the ‘intention’ present in my automatically
mimicking the premotor activity in your brain is in fact yours and not mine. But this is
where the naked intentions mentioned in the previous sub-section are invoked.
According to many simulationist interpreters of mirror neurons (Jeannerod and
Pacherie 2004; de Vignemont 2004; Hurley 2005; Gallese 2005), the premotor
activity of the observed agent that is replicated in the observer represents a ‘naked
intention’, an intention that is not represented as belonging to either the observer or
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the observed agent. The brain is then thought to employ what Georgieff and
Jeannerod (1998) call a ‘who system’, driven by the fact that the naked intention
representation either does or does not overlap with other representations such as that
of one’s own acting body, to ascribe the intention to the observer or to the agent.
But here, Gallagher and Zahavi finish the job by arguing that the notion of
‘simulation’ fails to make sense at the sub-personal level. ‘Simulation’, in the present
context, can mean one of two things:
1. The pretence definition: Simulation is an imitation, in the sense of something not
real—counterfeit; to simulate means to feign, to pretend
2. The instrumental definition: Simulation in the sense of a simulator: a model (a
thing) that we can use or do things with so we can understand the real thing
(Gallagher and Zahavi 2008a, p, 179)
The first definition cannot be applicable to neural resonance, since the notion of
‘pretence’ fails to make sense in that context:
[I]n subpersonal processes there is no pretence, and this is the case whether we
consider neuronal processes vehicles (mechanisms) or in terms of the content
that they might represent. (…) [W]hat these neurons represent or register
cannot be pretence in the way required for ST. They do not fire ‘as if’ I were
you. As we saw, proponents of implicit ST claim that the mirror system is
neutral with respect to the agent; there is no first- or third-person specification
involved. In that case it is not possible for them to register my intentions as
pretending to be your intentions. (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008a, p. 180; cf.
Gallagher 2007a, pp. 360–361)
The main problem with the second definition is that the exogenously produced,
passive character of neural resonance does not match the active, endogenously
produced character of simulation routines:
If simulation is characterized as a process that I (or my brain) instrumentally
use(s) or control(s), if this is what simulation is, then it seems clear that what is
happening in the implicit process of motor resonance is not simulation. (…) [It
doesn’t] make sense to say that at the subpersonal level the brain itself is using
a model or methodology, or comparing one experience with another, or
creating pretend states, or that one set of neurons makes use of another set of
neurons as a model. (…) [T]hese neuronal systems do not take the initiative;
they do not activate themselves, but are activated by the other person’s action.
(…) The other person has an effect on us. The other elicits this activation. This
is not a simulation, but a perceptual elicitation. (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008a,
p. 180; cf. Gallagher 2007a, pp. 360–361)
This last sentence is important. By rejecting a simulationist interpretation of neural
resonance, Gallagher and Zahavi do not claim that neural resonance plays no role in
social cognition. On the contrary, their claim is that neural resonance should be
characterised as enactive social perception rather than as simulation.
By calling neural resonance enactive social perception, Gallagher and Zahavi
emphasize that this form of perception is sensorimotor and not merely sensory
reception. They also stress that this form of perception is not instantaneous but a
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temporal phenomenon. This does not imply, however, that the neural process that
underlies enactive social perception can be subdivided in well demarcated temporal
stages. The time-lag between visual representation of an action and mirror neuron
activation, for instance, is too brief to be decisive about representing the process in
separate stages (30–100 ms; Gallagher and Zahavi 2008a, p. 179). Thus, mirror
neuron activity can be regarded as an integral part of an overall sensorimotor
perceptual process allowing us to acquire knowledge of the basic intentions and
emotions of others rather than as a separate simulation stage that follows visual
perception (i.e. mere sensory reception) of the other person’s actions and
expressions.
A problem: what role does neural resonance play in enactive social perception?
I think Gallagher and Zahavi’s criticism of the simulation reading of neural
resonance is convincing (I believe there is no point in arguing that one of the
definitions of simulation does apply at the low level (Herschbach 2008), nor do I
believe the phenomenology of social cognition may be characterised by a step-wise
procedure). I am also sympathetic to the enactivist social perception reading of
mirror neurons. Notwithstanding these sympathies, however, there is, I believe, a
gap in the overall position with regard to neural resonance and social cognition as
presented by Gallagher and Zahavi. One way of bringing this out is to pretend that
we are back in the early 1990s. The idea of enactivism is launched (Varela et al.
1991) but mirror neurons have not yet been discovered. Suppose someone is to
propose an enactivist theory of low-level social perception. According to enactivism,
an organism’s knowledge of its environment is contained in the way sensory
information is linked to motor output—the so-called sensorimotor contingencies.
That is, the restructuring of these links in recursive interaction of an organism with
its environment in which the organism adapts to it implies or specifies knowledge of
the world. The question is what the chances are that the hypothetical early enactivist
theory of social perception would predict neural resonance to be a part of the
sensorimotor contingencies underlying social perception. What are the chances that
the motor side of these contingencies would have been predicted to consist partly in
the neural mimicking of the observed action?
The chances would be very slim, I think, and that may be an understatement. The
point of enactivism is ‘to determine the common principles or lawful linkages
between sensory and motor systems that explain how action can be perceptually
guided in a perceiver-dependent world.’ (Varela et al. 1991, p. 173). Without prior
knowledge of mirror neurons, one would expect the motor components of the
sensorimotor contingencies to be related to the huge variety of behaviour that is
relevant and appropriate in response to observing meaningful actions of others. It is
obvious (I take it) that only a tiny fragment of this variety of behavioural responses
consists in imitation of the observed behaviour of the other. Hence, the systematic
occurrence of a very specific type of premotor activity that is only indirectly
connected to the motor side of the sensorimotor processes that constitute social
cognition would be unexpected. On top of that, the fact that this activity is congruent
with premotor activity in actual imitation of the observed behaviour would be even
more surprising. There is indeed something very remarkable and exciting about the so-
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called execution–observation overlap observed in mirror neurons, also to those who
would have favoured an enactive theory of social perception before their discovery.2
It is easy to understand how this surprising find initially gave rise to a simulation
reading. If this premotor activity is to contribute to acquiring a sense of the other
person’s intention or emotion, an interpretation of it in terms of a form of off-line re-
enactment along simulationist lines, as in the original Goldman and Gallese paper, is
not far-fetched; even though on closer inspection, it turns out to be a misleading
interpretation. Now in view of the fact that mirror neurons and neural resonance are
not an empirical discovery that would have been predicted per se from the viewpoint
of an enactive theory of social perception, the question becomes: how should we
interpret this discovery if not in terms of simulation? Asserting that mirror neurons
and neural resonance contribute to an overall sensorimotor process that subserves
social perception is not enough (if it would be enough, mirror neurons would be
predictable from an enactive theory of social perception). The question is why and
how social perception is subserved by this specific mirroring off-line premotor
activity.
Here, Gallagher and Zahavi retreat in their roles as phenomenologists. As such, it
is not their job to explain how sub-personal processes underlie what we at the
personal level experience as social perception, and maybe we should be careful here
and resist the temptation to speak of off-line premotor activity in the first place. At
any rate, Gallagher and Zahavi’s focus is on defying the suggestive power of the so-
called execution–observation overlap, rather than on giving it a real explanatory
function, by warning against unwarranted extrapolation from the neural to the
phenomenological level:
There is a crucial difference between claiming that my recognition of a certain
emotion in you requires me to experience the very same kind of emotion
immediately prior to ascribing it to you and claiming that the same neural
substrate subserves both the experience of an emotion and the recognition of
the same kind of emotion in others. The latter claim is considerably weaker.
(Zahavi 2008, p. 519)
In a similar vein, Gallagher warns against what he calls the fallacy of supposed
isomorphism between the neural, functional and phenomenological levels (see also
Gallagher 1997):
(…) there is no necessary isomorphism between the phenomenological, the
functional and the neuronal levels. So, if the neuronal process can be defined
as involving a stepwise process, this does not mean that a step-wise process
necessarily shows up at the level of experience, and vice versa. (…) This is tied
into the concept of multiple realizability. (Gallagher 2007a, p. 358)
2 It should be noted here that recent studies (e.g. Newman-Norlund et al. 2007) have shown that mirror
neuron activity is not always congruent with premotor activity in imitation. It has been observed to be
congruent with premotor activity related to cooperative behaviour as well. This would indeed fit with
Gallagher and Zahavi’s enactive social perception reading without raising the difficulty I am about to raise
(thanks to Harold Bekkering for pointing this out to me). However, relying on the avalanche of literature
that connects mirror neurons with premotor activity that is congruent with imitation in situations where
actual imitation would be inappropriate, the problem that I will outline still holds.
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The claim in passages such as these is that we need not draw conclusions about the
experiential level from suggestive data on the neural level. The execution–
observation overlap at the sub-personal level need not have a counterpart at the
experiential level in the form of an overlap between, e.g. the experience of an
emotion and the recognition of the same emotion in someone’s facial expression. In
fact, according to Gallagher and Zahavi, there is no such experiential counterpart. To
assume there is, is to follow the implicit simulationist’s scheme according to which
the initial stages of the processes of experiencing and recognizing an emotion consist
of the same neural representation and experience of a ‘naked’ emotion, and this
simply misrepresents what goes on at the experiential level.
I agree that the simulationist version of conceiving of an experiential counterpart
of the sub-personal execution–observation overlap is wrong-headed. But the position
that Gallagher and Zahavi seem to imply, which should replace or avoid such a
counterpart view, is not unproblematic either. According to this position, mirror
neuron activity may contribute to a larger neural process that subserves the
experience of an emotion while it may also contribute to another larger neural
process that subserves the recognition of a similar emotion in someone else’s
comportment. Given that what goes on at the experiential level is somehow
determined by the neural level, the question is what kind of relation between the
neural and the experiential level is assumed here.
Gallagher appeals, in passing, to the widely used concept of multiple realisation
in order to claim plausibility for his position on the relation between the sub-
personal (neural and functional) and the personal (phenomenological) level. But in
my view, the opposite effect is attained. Multiple realisation is a concept that was
essentially used in the context of a functionalist theory of the mind–brain relation
(Putnam 1967; Fodor 1974) in order to argue for the possibility of similar mental/
functional states being subserved by different material/neural states. The case here is
different in two respects: First of all, in the mirror neuron case, different higher-level
states are supposed to be realised by neural states with a significant overlap.
Secondly and more importantly, the relation of multiple realisability is not between
the neural and the functional level, but between the neural/function and the
phenomenological level, and this causes serious problems.
Gallagher and Zahavi’s position requires a theory of multiple realisation between
the neural/functional and the experiential levels. No such theory has been proposed,
as far as I know. At any rate, the required autonomy of the experiential level relative
to the neural/functional levels cannot be explained parallel to the way functionalists
explain the relative autonomy of functions relative to brain states. Functions are
explained to be relatively autonomous from neural/physical events (in the sense that
the same function does not imply the same neural/physical mechanism) in terms of a
distinction between roles (functions) and realisers (the neural/physical mechanisms
performing the function; Lewis 1972). But the experiential level that Gallagher and
Zahavi require to be autonomous resists redefinition in terms of causal roles.
Moreover, the functional level must serve here as the realiser level. It is not clear
what that would mean.3
3 It may seem that some sort of ‘natural supervenience’ relation a la Chalmers (1996) may be intended.
But in fact, such a relation typically does not allow for multiple realisation.
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Gallagher and Zahavi’s route to avoiding having to answer the question why and
how mirroring subserves enactive social perception, then, burdens them with an as
yet unsolved problem about the relation between the experiential and the neural/
functional level. This is no knockdown argument against their position. There are
more metaphysical mind–body-related problems unsolved, and it is not the
phenomenologist’s job to solve them. Still, it is worth striving for a phenomeno-
logical view on social cognition with the lowest metaphysical mortgage possible.
The threat of a very high metaphysical mortgage on Gallagher and Zahavi’s position
(i.e., the threat that their position requires a theory about the relation between the
neural/functional and the experiential level that we do not know how to begin to
imagine) is mainly due to their insistence on the fact that, e.g. experiencing an
emotion and recognizing it in others are qualitatively different states. This insistence
(which is an integral part of their anti-simulationist rethoric) creates a tension
with the fact that a part of the neural substrates of these states are nevertheless
similar or even identical. A theory of multiple realisation relation is meant to
alleviate this tension. But if we cannot expect such a theory to be forthcoming
under the assumption that experience and recognition are entirely different states at
the experiential level, it may be good to look for another way out. Assuming that
the execution–observation overlap at the neural/functional level accounts for some
overlap between experiencing an emotion and recognizing that emotion in
someone else would take the metaphysical pressure off. It would give the
unexpected discovery of mirror neuron activity a real place in our explanation of
social cognition.
The challenge is to do this without falling in the simulationist’s trap of imposing a
step-wise view of social cognition on the experiential level. The overlap between
experiencing and recognizing must not consist in the similarity between the initial
stages of these processes, i.e. in the experience of a ‘naked intention’ or ‘naked
emotion’. In the next section, I shall argue that this challenge can be met. I will try to
show that it is indeed possible to give the activity of mirror neurons a function in the
overall processes that underlie both experience and recognition such that the idea of
an experiential overlap between these experiential states becomes phenomenolog-
ically plausible.
I would like to end this section with a remark on the relation between
phenomenology and neuroscientific data. I take it as obvious that we should reject
views that use neural data to force views of our experience on us that flagrantly
contradict our phenomenology. But if we are open to neuroscientific confirmation of
phenomenological finds or the possibility of informing the setup of neuroscientific
experiments via neurophenomenology or what Gallagher and Zahavi call front-
loading phenomenology (2008a, pp. 33–40), we may also be open to the possibility
that neuroscience may help us in achieving a finer-grained picture of our
phenomenology (which need not imply committing the fallacy of supposed
isomorphism). Instead of as a one way street, we may view the relation between
phenomenology and the cognitive sciences as a dialectic reflective equilibrium in
order to be maximally fruitful. Hence, we should try to use whatever elbow room
there is in our descriptions of the experiential and the neural levels, within the limits
of phenomenological plausibility and within the limits set by the by the scientific
data, to make these descriptions mutually illuminating.
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A holistic model of neural resonance-based social cognition
Gallagher and Zahavi reject treating recognition and experience of basic intentions
and emotions as step-wise procedures. They stress that in our phenomenology,
recognition and experience do not have overlapping initial stages. I believe they are
right. But that does not mean that experiences and recognitions of emotions and
intentions are unstructured states, impenetrable by further analysis. My proposal is
that there is an in-between position that does explain the role of mirroring in social
cognition by assigning it a proper role in accounting for what goes on at the
experiential level, but without falling in the simulationist trap. Instead of as step-wise
procedures, we should view experiences and recognitions of intentions and emotions
as holistically structured states. As such, even though experiencing and recognizing
are entirely different as overall states, they nevertheless may share similar or even
identical constituents. That, at least, is what I will try to explain in this section. This
overlap may be accounted for at the neural level by mirror neuron activity.
Experiencing intentions and emotions as one’s own
Let me start with the idea that experiencing emotions and intentions as one’s own
can be analysed in terms of a holistic structure in our streams of consciousness. The
background for this view is a notion that I will label ‘embodied autobiography’, for
lack of a better term. The interlocking of perceptual, proprioceptive and inter-
coceptive information is fundamental to this notion.
Perceptual, proprioceptive and intercoceptive information is provided by the body
and its sense organs and processed by the brain to produce the ‘backbone’ of our
stream of consciousness. This information interlocks in such a way that the
experiences it yields, if conceptualized, would be intelligible as a coherent primitive
narrative. To quote P.F. Strawson:
[A] temporally extended series of [perceptual] experiences should have a
certain character of connectedness and unity, secured to it by concepts of the
objective (…) as a fundamental condition for the possibility of self-
consciousness. That experience should be experience of a unified objective
world at least makes room for the idea of one subjective or experiential route
through the world, traced out by one series of experiences which together yield
one unified experience of the world—a potential autobiography. (Strawson
1966, p. 163)
Thus, consecutive visual perceptions issued by one body display an order revealing
the double-sided ‘story’ of, on the one hand, a physical body tracing a
spatiotemporal path through the world and, on the other hand, the visual features
of various consecutive locations of that path the eyes are turned to. It is important
not to conceive of such experiences as a mere series of ‘pictures’ in our minds, but
rather as a series of lived experiences of a situated body. Such a sequence is
integrated with other sense perceptions in ways that allow us to make sense of the
world and one’s bodies in it. For instance, when approaching an object (the object
becomes bigger in ones visual field in a way that ‘matches’ with the proprioception
of one’s walking body etc.), while hearing a sound that is increasingly becoming
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louder and loudest when one is closest to the object, we will experience the object as
the source of the sound (a loudspeaker, say). There is an order in ones sense
perceptions and proprioceptions that is determined by the features and regularities of
the physical world on the one hand and by one’s embodiment and the workings of
our senses on the other. Such an order can be violated by odd experiences (such as,
e.g. looking upwards, feeling ones head being tilted backwards and seeing one’s own
feet) and restored when these experiences can be explained as illusions.
This basic synchronic and diachronic coherence in our experiences, provided by
the body as an ‘objective continuant’ (McDowell 1998), is the backbone of our
stream of consciousness in that it forms the background against which other
experiences take place and against which they acquire coherence. Let me give an
example and discuss the extent to which we can extrapolate from it below: Suppose I
walk in a dark alley and see a figure approaching me. The figure frightens me. This
immediately makes me ‘decide’ or intend to turn around and walk away. After
having acted on that intention, reaching a crowded street, I slowly feel my anxiety
diminishing. In this scene, my emotions and intentions interlock with my sense
perceptions, proprioceptions and interoceptions in such a way that the various
‘elements’ and stages of my entire stream of consciousness cohere and make each
other’s appearance intelligible. Conceptualising (and hence distorting through
abstraction from) what happened, we might say that my emotion (which I take,
following James, to involve the interoception of visceral processes) was caused by
perceptions, my intention to turn around was caused by my fright and my
consecutive walking away, accompanied by specific proprioceptions and percep-
tions, was caused by my intention etc. The emotion and intention ‘blend in’ with
what I shall label (after Strawson) my ‘embodied autobiography’: my stream of
consciousness as determined by my situated body.
In other words, the idea is that the emotion and intention do not just occur
contingently against the background of embodied autobiography; rather, their
occurrence becomes intelligible against it. Even stronger: The full ‘content’4 of the
emotion and intention is co-determined by their context of perceptions, proprio-
ceptions and interoceptions. The particular quality of my fear, for instance, is
inseparably connected with my perception of the scary figure. I do not experience
the fear and the perception of the figure as contingently connected components
(regardless of the fact that the visual cortex (responsible of the perception of the
figure) and the amygdala (responsible for my experience of fear) are distinct parts of
the brain). It is not as if a different visual perception may have been accompanied by
the exact same fear. My fear is of that figure, there and then. The same goes for the
quality of resoluteness of my intention to walk away, which is strongly coloured by
my fear, and for many other ‘connections’ between the experiential ‘constituents’ of
my stream of consciousness. Even though these constituents may be processed in
different parts of the brain, the overall experience they yield is, in general, a holistic
structure, unified to such a degree that we can only speak of experiential constituents
by abstracting from experience.
4 The scare quotes are meant to indicate that in using this term, I am in no way implying conceptual or
propositional content.
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The claim I wish to make in this section is that what it means to experience an
emotion or intention as one’s own (rather than as someone else’s; see “Recognizing
emotions and intentions in others: neural resonance without simulation” section) is
that such an intention or emotion is embedded in one’s overall embodied
autobiography in the same way as the emotion and intention in the above example.5
This claim rests on the idea that the embodied self to whom emotions and intentions
are ‘attributed’ (i.e. who is implied in experience as the subject of these emotions
and intentions) is represented in our streams of consciousness by means of our
embodied autobiography. This is basically a neo-Kantian view in which the body as
objective continuant and precondition for coherent synchronic and diachronic
experience plays the role of the transcendental ego. But in order to apply it to the
current issue, I will briefly compare it to two notions of the self, taken from the wide
variety of notions available in the literature, to which I think the idea of an embodied
self implied by (rather than represented in) our streams of consciousness is
congenial: the ‘ecological self’ (Neisser 1988) and the ‘minimal self’ (Gallagher
2000).
Ulric Neisser describes the ecological self as ‘the self as perceived with respect to
the physical environment: I am the person here in this place, engaged in this
particular activity.’ (Neisser 1988, p. 36; see Barker 1968 for inclusion of aspects of
the social environment, such as rituals, as items relative to which the ecological self
is perceived). This, I believe, is the self whose continuity connects the various stages
of my embodied autobiography. Unlike Neisser, however, I wish to stress the way in
which the ecological self is presented ‘from within’ and how it is present in the way
it shapes our streams of consciousness. This apparently makes the self I am after
overlap with what Neisser calls the private self. Here, the status of the body is
important. Body schemata as ‘silent organizations’ (Scheerer 1954) are crucial in
transforming bodily information into a perspectival representation of one’s
surroundings. This is the sense in which the self I am after is embodied.
Even though I would like it to be as minimal as possible, this embodied self is
slightly richer than what Gallagher (2000) calls the minimal self; the basic,
immediate, primitive subject that is not extended in time but confined to the
‘specious’ present. Still, it is important not to exaggerate the differences. The self
5 As one anonymous referee pointed out, here it may well be argued that the embeddedness of an emotion
or intention in an embodied biography itself is an explanandum rather than an explanans of self-
attribution. One thing to point out here is that embeddedness in an embodied biography is meant to
elucidate what experiencing an intention or emotion as being had by oneself as an embodied being
consists in. Thus, it is intended as an analysans rather than an explanans. Having said that, though, I do
admit that what it means for an emotion or intention to cohere with an embodied biography stands in need
of much further explanation. Though I have tried to provide some explanation in previous work (Slors
1998, 2001a, b), I now think that these explanations are little more than appeals to intuition. A more
promising approach to this issue is hinted at by Richard Menary in his paper on embodied narratives
(Menary 2008). In the third section of that paper, Menary explains how what I called ‘narrative coherence’
of experiences in what I here call an embodied biography can be analysed in terms of Gallagher’s (2005)
notions of body image and body schema. Though I believe that route to be fruitful as a way of actually
explaining what coherence with an embodied biography consists in, I cannot pursue this point here. For
the remainder of this paper, I shall draw on an intuitive understanding of such coherence.
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implied by our embodied autobiographies does extend over time, but not so as to
constitute personal identity over time.6 Provided that the ‘specious’ present is
defined broad enough to encompass short scenes such as the above (I am aware that
this is a big proviso), there need not be a major difference with the minimal self in
this respect. The claim that an intention or emotion must fit one’s embodied
biography in order to be experienced as one’s own is not meant to imply that
emotions and intentions require coherence with a real narrative autobiographical self
in order to be considered one’s own. The embodied autobiography in which
emotions and intentions are experienced as ‘had by’ what Neisser calls an ecological
self, which is principally embodied in the sense indicated above, can be as short as
the attention span required for a specific action sequence in response to occurrences
in the environment, such as the dark alley example. The main apparent difference
between the embodied self I am after and the minimal self is in the way in which the
self can be said to be the subject of emotions and intentions, the way in which it is
implied when we experience simple emotions and intentions as our own.
Self-ascription of an intention, on Gallagher’s view (discussed mainly in the
context of possible mis-identification of a motor intention as one’s own), is
explained in terms of the match between the intention and an efference copy of the
ensuing motor command (or even the intended state of affairs in the world and the
sensory re-afferent feedback about the result of the action caused by the motor
command; Gallagher 2000, pp. 16–17). My claim, by contrast, is that an intention or
emotion is experienced as one’s own if it fits in with one’s embodied autobiography.
A basic motor intention that is unrelated to the perceived affordances of the
environment, that lacks every ‘motivation’, e.g. in the form of preceding emotions
calling for a bodily response (in the above example: fear) and that does not have a
follow-up in the form of perceived and proprioceived bodily movements, for
instance, cannot be an intention one experiences as one’s own in the sense relevant
for our discussion.
These italics are important. But before explaining them, let me stress that the
difference between Gallaghers view and mine does not imply mutual exclusion.
Gallaghers account is mainly sub-personal, while I am interested in analysing the
experience of ownership, and to the extent that Gallagher’s account does filter
through to the experiential realm, the match between an intention and an efference
copy of the motor command is precisely one way of fitting into an embodied
autobiography (of which the efference copy is a part). I think that it is entirely
plausible to assume that this match is an essential requirement for self-attribution, a
necessary condition. The difference between Gallagher’s minimal self and the
embodied self I would like to employ is that I wish to claim this necessary condition
6 I did describe the embodied self in that way, however, in previous work (Slors 1998, 2001a, b). I now
believe that Richard Menary is correct in pointing out that my position can be viewed as showing how
Gallagher’s minimal self can form the basis for an embodied narrative self that may possibly ground
personal identity over time (Menary 2008, pp. 75–76) without actually being such a narrative self (see
especially his note 8).
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is not sufficient. There is more to experiencing an intention as one’s own than the
match of an intention with the efference copy of the following motor command. A
hypothetical state in which there is a match between intention and efference copy,
but in which the intention has no further connections with our embodied
autobiography, is not a state in which the intention is experienced as one’s own in
a sense that is relevant to our discussion.
Now to the italics: The point is that the kind of self-ascription we are interested in
in the context of social cognition is the kind that is relevant to explaining how and
why we experience intentions and emotions ‘fully clothed in agent specification’
(Gallagher 2007a, p. 358). I do not see how agent specification can be anything
other than identifying a body as the locus of an intention or emotion. So the question
is whether the account of the experience of first-person ownership in terms of fitting
one’s embodied autobiography is correct in general. I do not know how to argue for
this briefly, other than by (a) noting that the idea is, as I believe, intuitively and
phenomenologically plausible and (b) using the remainder of this paper to show how
it can help to solve the puzzle outlined in the previous section.
Recognizing emotions and intentions in others: neural resonance without simulation
The solution to this puzzle I wish to propose hinges on the idea that both the
experience of an emotion/intention as my own and the recognition of the same type
of emotion/intention as someone else’s can be analysed in terms of the holistic
structure of this experience and recognition. In the previous section, I outlined this
idea with respect to experiencing intentions and emotions as one’s own. Before
discussing recognizing emotions and intentions as someone else’s, it may be helpful
to say a bit more about the holistic structuring of experiences/recognitions.
Holistically structured states, in my use of this term, have constituents—‘parts’—
that may have discretely identifiable neural correlates but that ‘blend’ into each other
at the experiential level. My fear of the figure in the dark alley is subserved by neural
activity in the visual cortex and in the amygdala. Even so, my experience of ‘a scary
figure’ does not, at the experiential level, consist in a contingent conjunction of two
discrete components, a conscious ‘image’ and the experience of fear. Rather, I have
one experience: my fear of a certain figure. This is parallel to the way in which we
experience a moving coloured object as one phenomenon, even though its
movement, colour and shape are processed in separate parts of the visual cortex.7
What I mean to imply by saying that a state is holistically structured is this:
Although at the experiential level we can only speak of constituents or parts by
abstracting from what is a stage of one stream of consciousness, there is a structure
in the neural substrate of this stage that may to some degree parallel the structure of
the experiential abstractions (depending, of course on how these abstractions carve-
7 I shall ignore the question whether this involves a binding problem and whether assuming such a
problem involves a wrong-headed conception of experience that commits us to what Gallagher calls the
fallacy of supposed isomorphism or what Noë and Thompson (2004) call the matching-content doctrine.
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up our experience). This structure, in all likelihood, is a causal structure (in the scary
figure example: The activity in the amygdala is causally preceded by the activity in
the visual cortex).8
The constituents of stages of our stream of consciousness are not, I believe,
experiences in their own right. I can abstract from a certain experience of mine a
feeling of fear or a visual perception of a figure in a dark alleyway. But to think of
these components in abstraction from their contexts would be to abstract away from
experience as such. Consider, as a parallel, experiencing the shape of an object in
abstraction from its colour (it is not even black, white or gray). That is not an
experience, but an abstraction. Nevertheless, the part of the visual cortex that is
responsible for processing the shape of a perceived object does contribute to an
overall experience of a coloured object.
The same is true of the neural activity of so-called shared representations such as
mirror neurons. It may contribute to, e.g. an overall state of me experiencing an
intention or emotion as my own. Even so, it is wrong to say that this specific activity
on its own underlies the experience of an intention or emotion. This is why Zahavi is
right when he writes that ‘[t]here is a crucial difference between claiming that my
recognition of a certain emotion in you requires me to experience the very same kind
of emotion immediately prior to ascribing it to you and claiming that the same neural
substrate subserves both the experience of an emotion and the recognition of the
same kind of emotion in others.’ (Zahavi 2008, p. 519) The latter is true but the
former is false. The assumption that the former is implied by the latter is motivated
by the idea that this same neural substrate by itself constitutes or realises the
emotion, both in the case of my experiencing it and in the case of recognizing it in
others. The account of my experience of my own emotion as a holistically structured
state explains why this idea is wrong and why Zahavi is right: The shared substrate
is only one constituent among many of my experience, while these constituents
together realise one experience.
This brings us to the question what happens when such a shared neural substrate,
the activity of a shared neural ‘representation’, is induced by observing the facial
expression or bodily comportment of another person. The first thing to note is that it
is likely that this representation will not fit holistically into the embodied
autobiography of the observer. Chances are that, for instance, the visceral
interoceptions accompanying the observed person’s emotional state and the motor
intentions in response to the observed person’s emotions are completely lacking in
the embodied autobiography of the observer, and this does not even mention the
cause of the emotion—that which the fear is fear of, the grief is grief about etc.—
which may well be lacking for the observer too. On the account I am advocating this
implies that the observer will not, not even initially, experience the emotion as her
own as, e.g. Goldman’s simulationism seems to suppose9 (if by accident the emotion
9 I owe this idea to a discussion with Derek Strijbos.
8 By ‘causal dependence’ I mean nothing deeper than ‘being temporally preceded by and counterfactually
dependent on’.
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does fit into the observer’s embodied autobiography, I take it that the observer will
‘mistakenly’ attribute the emotion to herself).10
The not fitting in with the observer’s embodied autobiography rules out that the
observer experiences the emotion as her own, on the account. This may seem to
leave open the possibility that she experiences it as a ‘naked emotion’, an emotion
that is not yet attributed. But that option is ruled out by the idea that ‘naked
emotions’ and ‘naked intentions’ are not experiences in their own right. They are
constituents of overall states when they holistically fit in with other constituents. In
the case of self-attributed emotions or intentions, this fitting in is contributing to the
experiencer’s embodied autobiography. The question, then, is what other constitu-
ents the shared representation fits in with in the case of recognizing someone else’s
emotion. If it does not contribute to an experience of an emotion or intention as
one’s own, what does it contribute to?
Well, to the recognition of an emotion or intention in someone else’s facial
expression, gesture or bodily comportment, at the neural/functional level, there is a
causal connection between the representation of the expression or gesture in the
visual cortex and the activity of mirror neurons or other ‘representations’ shared with
the substrates of my experiencing an emotion or intention myself. At the experiential
level, this results in a connection much like the connection between the fear and the
figure in the alley example of “Experiencing intentions and emotions as one’s own”
section. Just like the fear is fear of the figure, the resonated-with intention or emotion
is experienced in the expression or gesture that evoked the resonance.
A parallel might help to make the point: Suppose you are outside and there are
large clouds in the sky with patches of blue sky in between. Every now and then the
sun appears from behind the clouds only to be blocked by yet other clouds a minute
or so later. When the sun appears, you feel warmth on your skin and you see light.
The light and the warmth are not separate experiences that are at some moment
understood as being connected through induction. Rather, they are experienced as
aspects of one phenomenon: the sun appearing. In a similar fashion, the visual
representation of the gesture or expression and the activation of neural structures that
are also involved in one’s own experience of a specific intention or emotion yield a
10 Here, I focus merely on self or other attribution. What about shared emotions? I think we should
distinguish between cases in which emotions are shared due to empathy or emotional contagion and cases
in which emotions are shared simply because two or more people have an emotion in common (as, e.g. on
a funeral). I will discuss the first case later on (see also note 12). The latter kind of case, however, points to
a limitation of the view I am developing that might allow for empirical corroboration or falsification
(thanks to Sebo Uithol for pointing this out to me). Suppose I am experiencing grief while attending a
funeral. My grief fits in with my embodied biography and so I experience it as mine. Suppose I look at
someone else’s face expressing grief similar to mine. My claim is that part of what it is for me to see
emotions in the facial expressions of others by means of neural resonance is the fact that the resonated
with emotion does not fit in with my embodied biography. Hence, it seems the model I propose would
predict that when I am experiencing a certain emotion myself, I am not able to recognize it in the face of
another by means of neural resonance. If I see in someone else’s face an emotion similar to the one I
experience at that moment, as in the funeral case, this recognition cannot be grounded in neural resonance.
It is, however, unrealistic to claim that neural resonance is the only mechanism for social cognition. The
model to be proposed, then, would predict that in cases such as the funeral scenario, emotion recognition
is subserved by some other mechanism than neural resonance.
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perception of one phenomenon: the other person experiencing that emotion or
intention. We perceive happiness in the smile. We perceive the intention in the
grasping movement. The central idea here is again that of mental holism, the idea
that experiences, perceptions and sensations shape and colour each other and
determine each other’s meaning or sense.
The position that results from this holistic model of neural resonance based social
cognition differs from Goldman-style simulationism in that neural resonance is not
thought to result in a ‘naked’ experience or registering of an emotion that is
subsequently attributed to someone else. Neural resonance is not a first stage in a
process but rather one part of a larger neural substrate underlying the state of
recognizing an emotion in someone else. Following Gallese (2001), however, the
model does allow for an experiential overlap between recognizing an emotion in
someone else and experiencing that emotion oneself. The fact that part of the neural
activity underlying a person’s fear, for instance, also underlies that person’s state of
recognizing fear in someone else’s facial expression may well explain an experiential
overlap between fearing and recognizing fear. I believe this overlap exists. To a
certain extent, seeing fear in someone else’s face is a bit like being afraid oneself.
But the difference between the holistic model and stage-wise simulationism explains
why this overlap allows us to agree with Zahavi that ‘[w]hen I experience the facial
expressions or meaningful actions of an other, I am experiencing foreign
subjectivity, and not merely imagining it, simulating it or theorizing about it.’
(Zahavi 2008, p. 520). For the overlap is only partial, the total states of experience
and recognition do differ considerably both in neural and experiential respects.
I doubt whether Zahavi would consider the ‘otherness’ of an emotion recognized
in someone’s facial expression foreign enough on the model proposed. There is a
remnant of simulationism in it after all: recognizing fear in someone’s face is not, on
the proposed model, depicted as a state that is completely different from
experiencing fear oneself. Nevertheless, the difference between (1) a feeling being
a part of one’s own embodied biography, naturally and ‘logically’ fitting in with
one’s proprioceptions, interceptions and perceptions on the one hand and (2) a
feeling not fitting in thus but occurring simultaneously with a perception of a facial
expression or gesture of another person on the other does constitute a principled
difference between self-ascription of, e.g. an emotion and other-ascription.
Moreover, on this way of distinguishing one’s own subjectivity from foreign
subjectivity, perceiving the latter is not portrayed as ‘merely imagining it, simulating
it or theorizing about it.’ Thus, the holistic model of neural resonance-based social
cognition occupies a middle ground in between theories of social cognition in terms
of simulation and theories in terms of social perception.11
What then, on this model, is the difference between seeing, e.g. happiness in
someone else’s face on the one hand and emotional contagion—or simply starting to
11 If it is argued that phenomenologically the difference between self- and other-ascription is such that
there is no experiential overlap, the response would have to be a double one. On the one hand, I believe
that this is typically a case in which empirical science is able to illuminate the phenomenology of many
instances of, e.g. emotion recognition (see the end of “A problem: what role does neural resonance play in
enactive social perception?” section). On the other hand, the claim is certainly not that all instances of
emotion recognition are mediated by neural resonance; it is certainly likely that there are other cognitive
mechanisms for this (cf. Gallagher’s snake-handling example in Gallagher 2007a).
454 M. Slors
feel happy oneself as a result of seeing someone else smile—on the other? The
difference, I speculate, is that in cases of, e.g. emotional contagion, the neural
activity that results from resonance (e.g. mirror neuron activity) is not taken off-line
(to use this simulationist terminology). Seeing a smile may result, through reso-
nance, in the activation of one’s own facial muscles. The resonator’s proprioception
of the contractions of her own facial muscles and whatever other bodily expressions
the contagion results in will be processed as part of the resonator’s own embodied
biography. Thus, the resonance activity starts to contribute, according to the
proposed model, to an overall state that will be experienced, if at all, as the
resonator’s own. Insofar as this means that the experiential focus is no longer on
the other person’s emotional state, the holistic connection with the visual
perception of the other’s behaviour is likely to fade. Thus, though neural resonance
may contribute to emotional contagion and to social cognition, the holistic model
can keep the two apart.12
A solution and an empty question
Thus, there is an overlap on the experiential level between experiencing an emotion
or intention and recognizing these in the comportment of others. Both kinds of state
share an experiential constituent accounted for by a shared part of their overall
neural substrates. Seeing fear is a bit like being afraid. Seeing happiness is a bit like
feeling happy, but only a bit. Social cognition is not exactly emotional contagion.
The idea of a partial experiential overlap can be illustrated by a parallel: The
perception of a red square and the perception of a green square have an experiential
overlap accounted for by similar activity in the part of the visual cortex that
processes shape. Or compare tasting an Italian pasta sauce and a Thai green curry:
Although the overall flavours are hugely different, I may well be able to note that
both contain a fair amount of basil. If the holistic model of social cognition is
correct, something similar goes for experiencing fear, happiness etc. and recognizing
these emotions in others.
This model, I contend, takes the metaphysical pressure off of the view of
Gallagher and Zahavi: Recognition and experience are, as whole states of
consciousness, truly distinct, qualitatively different states—it is true that I do not
look into myself in order to ascribe an emotion to you and when I see your emotion,
I see foreign subjectivity. But experience and recognition do share a component, at
the experiential level, which is accounted for by an overlap in their neural substrates.
Thus, there is no need for a problematic theory of multiple realization between the
neural/functional and the experiential level (see the section entitled “A problem:
what role does neural resonance play in enactive social perception?”).
Put in this way, the view of holistically structured states would be a slight
modification of Gallagher and Zahavi’s position intended to solve a problem in it.
The problem that is addressed by this amendment arose from the fact that Gallagher
and Zahavi described experiences and recognition as qualitatively different without
12 The boundaries between emotional contagion, empathy etc. and social cognition are not always clear.
This vagueness can be accounted for in term of the fact that what may be fitted into one’s own embodied
biography may simultaneously match perceived behaviour of the other.
Between implicit simulation and social perception 455
describing them as structured in a way that allows for experiential overlap. But that
may well be due to the anti-simulationist rethoric, countering the simulationist
tendency to ignore the qualitative difference between first- and third-person
experiences and attributions. If that is the case and if there is allowance for an
analysis of the proposed experiential structure of experiences and recognitions of
emotion, then it may very well be that it is precisely something along the lines of the
view proposed that Gallagher had in mind when he invoked the notion of multiple
realisation.
Especially in view of this latter possibility, it is fair to ask whether the position I
end up with is in fact Gallagher and Zahavi’s position. Though the positions are, as
far as I can see, certainly compatible, I also think there may be some difference, at
least in emphasis. The notion of holistically structured states and the concurrent idea
that there is indeed experiential overlap between experiencing and recognizing
emotions and intentions is not part of Gallagher and Zahavi’s theory, and there is,
indeed, a simulationist ‘flavour’ to claiming that recognizing an emotion or intention
in the facial expression or gesture of another person does, partly, feel like
experiencing that emotion or intention oneself. This fact is ignored or downplayed
by the term ‘perception’.
So, is neural resonance-based social cognition perception or simulation? If the
account of neural resonance-based social cognition sketched in this section is
anywhere near roughly correct, I think it is best to adopt a strategy borrowed from
Parfit (1984) with respect to this question. We should ask whether there something
we do not know if we do not know whether neural resonance-based social cognition
is simulation or perception. The answer, I believe, is no. If the picture sketched in
this section is more or less accurate, the simulation-or-perception question becomes
an empty question. The personal-level terminology does not illuminate the sub-
personal neural/functional data. Moreover, conversely, the discovery of mirror
neurons has focussed our attention to an overlap at the experiential level between
experiencing and recognizing intentions and emotions, and new terms such as
‘shared manifold’ (Gallese 2001), pitched at the neural level, express this
experiential fact more accurately than traditional personal-level terminology. Rather
than debating over which personal-level terminology we should apply to describe the
sub-personal data, in this case, it may be better to let the sub-personal data illuminate
our personal-level terminology.
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